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[L. A. No. 25143. In Bank. Jan. 26,1960.] 
PETRI CLEANERS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. 
AUTOMOTIVE EMPLOYEES, LAUNDRY DRIVERS 
AND HELPERS LOCAL NUMBER 88, Appellant. 
[1] Labor-Legislation Governing: Strikes.-Where an employer 
is not engaged in interstate commerce and there is a dispute 
between a labor nnion and an independent association of em-
ployees as to which organization shall be the exclusive bar-
gaining agent of the employer's employees, the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197) is not applicable; 
the governing statute is the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. 
Code, § 1115 et seq.) 
[2] Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-The issue 
whether an independent association of employees was a ''labor 
organization" within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike 
Act did not become moot by virtue of the one-year limitation 
in Lab. Code, § 1117, that limitation being measured from the 
date "of the commencement of any proceeding brought under 
this chapter [chap. 7, relating to jurisdictional strikes]," 
which means from the date the complaint is filed (Code Civ. 
Proc., §S50), where all the facts bearing on the association's 
independence took place within seven months prior to filing 
the complaint. 
[8] Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-If an asso-
ciation of employees was "interfered with, dominated or con-
trolled" by the employer, it was not a ''labor organization" 
within the meaning of Lab. Code, § 1117, and there was DO 
jurisdictional strike, within the meaning of § 1118, where 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Labor, §§ 12, 107, 120 et seq. 
HeX. Dig. References: [1] Labor, §§ la, 21; [2-6,8] Labor, § 21; 
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another labor union maintained a strike for recognition 
against such el:lployer. 
[4] Id. - Jurisdictional Strikes - Labor Organizations.-Federal 
decisions construing the Labor Management Relations Act, 
§ 8(a) (1) and (2), are persuasive in interpreting Lab. Code, 
§ 1117, defining "labor organization," since the language and 
policy of the two acts are similar. 
[5] Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-Activities 
that constitute interference with a union include manifesta-
tions by the employer that he favors one union over the other, 
interrogation of employees as to their union sympathies, espe-
cially when coupled with threats of discharge for supporting 
the outside union or promises of economic benefits for remain-
ing loyal to the company, solicitation by management of union 
withdrawal letters, unequal advantages conferred on the inside 
union that are denied to the outside union, such as use of 
company time and property, and hasty recognition of the in-
side union, as contrasted with marked reluctance to recognize 
the outside union. 
[6] Id.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-Undisputed\ 
evidence established as a matter of law that an employer seek-
ing to enjoin a union of laundry drivers from picketing or 
otherwise interfering with the employer's business "interfered 
with" an independent association of employees so as to pre-
clude such association from being a "labor organization" 
within the meaning of the Jurisdictional Strike Act where the 
employer's president and plant manager conducted coercive 
interrogations, giving several drivers the "choice" of re-
nouncing union membership or being discharged, where the 
employer provided its drivers with a prepared letter of with-
drawal from the union and initially discharged two drivers 
who refused to withdraw, where the employer repeatedly an-
nounced that it would not bargain with the union, at the same 
time encouraging the formation of the association through 
assurances that the inside group enjoyed the employer's com-
plete approval, and where the employer permitted the associa-
tion to use its property and bulletin board at all meetings fol-
lowing the organizational meeting-a privilege it did not ex-
tend to the union. 
[7] Id.-Labor Unions-Closed or Union Shop Contracts.-Lab. 
Code, § 921, providing that promises embodied in yellow-dog 
contracts shall not be enforced, § 922, providing that any 
person who coerces another to enter into such a contract as a 
condition of employment is guilty of a misdemeanor, and § 923, 
announcing it to be the public policy of the state "to uphold 
the freedom of employees to organize and enter into collective 
bargaining contracts for their own protection," do not preclude 
.) 
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promises to join independent labor organizations, closed or 
union shop contract~, or concerted activities to obtain such 
contracts, and they do not place on the employer an affirmative 
duty to bargain. An employer faced with a union's demand 
for recognition still has the choice of yielding to the union's 
demands or continuing to endure the interference with its 
business relations which the union's activities caused. 
[8] ld.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Purpose and Effect of Statute.-
The Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120, 1122) 
was designed, not to diminish free competition between labor 
and industry, but to release an innocent employer caught be-
tween the rival claims of two or more labor organilmtions. It 
does not apply unless there are at least two ''labor or/!aniza-
tions" within the meaning of § 1117, and the prohibited activi-
ty arises out of a dispute between them as to which has the 
exclusive right to bargain with an employer or to have its 
members work for him. The employer may not only enjoin a 
jurisdictional strike (Lab. Code, § 1116), but refuse to bargain 
with either organization. 
[9] ld.-Collective Bargaining Contracts.-It is for the Legisla' 
ture to determine whether voluntary bargaining should be dis-
placed by a rule compelling the employer to bargain with the 
representatives of a majority of his employees. The Supreme 
Court cannot usurp legislative power by enacting rules of law 
patterned on the Labor Management Relations Act, and it can-
not create the administrative machinery necessary to make 
sueh rules workable. 
[10] ld.-Collective Bargaining Contracts.-Employers are not re-
quired by law to engllg:e in collective bargaining and closed 
or union shop agreements and concerted activities to achieve 
them are lawful " .. hether or not a majority of the employees 
directly involved wish such agreements. (Overruling Garmon v. 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Ca1.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473] ; 
Retail Clerh' Union v. Superior Court, 52Cn1.2d 222 [339 P.2d 
839], and disapproving Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 
P.2d 801] insofar as inconsistent with views expressed in this 
case.) 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County granting and denying injunctive relief. Harry 
M. Hunt, Judge pro tem.· Order granting injunctive relief, 
reversed j order denying injunctive relief, affirmed. 
Stevenson & Hackler, Stevenson, Hackler & Ansell and Her-
bert M. Ansell for Appellant. 
• Appointed pursuant to stipUlation, see Const., art. VI, ~ 5. 
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Rutan, Lindsay, Dahl, Smedegaard, Howell & Tucker, 
Milford W. Dahl, W. W. McCray, Severson, Zang, Werson, 
Berke & Larson and Nathan R. Berke for Respondent. 
Br()nson, Bronson & McKinnon and Charles A. Rummel as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR. J.-Defendant Automotive Employees, Laun-
dry Drivers and Helpers Local Number 88 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendant) appeals from two orders of the trial 
court. One granted plaintiff's motion under the Jurisdictional 
Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120, 1122) for a preliminary 
injunction against defendant's strike for recognition; the other 
denied defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction to 
compel plaintiff to bargain with defendant instead of the 
Independent Association of Petri Employees (hereinafter 
called the Association), an alleged company union. 
[1] Since plaintiff is not engaged in interstate co~rce, 
the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 
(1947») is not applicable. The governing statute is the Juris-
dictional Strike Act. Plaintiff contends that there is a labor 
dispute between defendant and the Association as to which 
organization shall be the exclusive bargaining agent of plain-
tiff's employees and defendant's picketing therefore violates 
the act. Defendant contends that there has been no violation 
on the ground that the Association is not a labor organization 
within the meaning of the act. 
[2 ] This issue has not become moot by the passage of time. 
Although plaintiff urges that if the matter had proceeded to 
trial on the permanent injunction, facts relating to the for-
mation of the Association would have been irrelevant because 
of the one-year limitation in section 1117, that limitation is 
measured from the date "of the commencement of any pro-
ceeding brought under this chapter. " An action is commenced 
when the complaint is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 350.) Plaintiff 
filed its complaint on January 14, 1958, and all the facts bear-
ing on the issue of the Association's independence took place 
from June 1957 to January 1958. 
Section 1117 of the Labor Code provides in part: 
"As used herein, 'labor organization' means any organiza-
tion or any agency or employee representation committee or 
any local unit thereof in which employees participate, and 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours 
\ 
j 
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of employment or conditions of work, which labor organization 
is not found to be or to have been financed in whole or in part, 
interfered with, dominated or controlled by tIle employer or 
any employer association within one year of the commencement 
of any proceeding brought under this chapter. The plaintiff 
shall have the affirmative of the issue with respect to estab-
lishing the existence of a 'labor organization' as defined 
herein. " 
Section 1115 provides that a jurisdictional strike is unlaw-
ful and section 1118 defines such a strike as 
" ... a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer 
or any other concerted interference with an employer's opera-
tion or business, arising out of a controversy between two or 
more labor organizations as to which of them has or should 
have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an em-
ployer on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising 
out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations 
as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right 
to have its members perform work for an employer." \ 
[3] If the Association was •• interfered with, dominated 
or controlled"l by plaintiff, it is not a "labor organization" 
within the meaning of section 1117 and there has been no 
jurisdictional strike within the meaning of section 1118 .. The 
determination of this issue is crucial to defendant's appeal 
from the order granting a preliminary injunction against 
defendant's strike. In deciding that issue' we must first 
interpret the terms •• interfered with, dominated or controlled" 
and then in the light of our interpretation determine whether 
plaintiff sustained its burden of proving that the Association 
is a labor organization. 
[ 4] Federal decisions construing section 8 (a) (1) and 
(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act2 are persuasive 
in interpreting section 1117, for the language and policy of 
the two acts are similar. (See In re Porterfield, 28 Ca1.2d 91, 
'Since defendant does not attack the trial court's finding that the 
Association was not" financed in whole or in part" by p1aDrtiff, we have 
no occasion to consider that part of section 1117. 
'''It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restTain, or coeree employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed in se~,tion 7 of this title; 
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration 
of any labor organization or eontribute financial support to 
it .•.• " 
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119 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] ; Nuffer v. City of Santa 
Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 298 [168 P.2d 741].) The federal 
case!'; have singled out typical activities condemned by the 
federal act. }'indings that an employer dominated an inside 
union are usually based 011 obvious employer intrusion such as 
statements by the employer to employees 011 company time and 
property that he will not recogllize an outside union but will 
deal 'with ail inside association, discharging employees who 
solicit members for the outside union, openly leading the drive 
for an inside association by supplying literature and lists of 
the employees' names and addresses, permitting organizational 
meetings on company property, and directly soliciting mem-
bers for the inside association. (E.g., National Labor Relations 
Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318 [60 8.Ct. 918, 
84 L.Ed. 1226]; see note, Employer-Dominated Uniolls-
Illusory Self-O"ganization, 40 Columb.L.Rev. 278, 283-290.) 
[5] Activities that constitute interference include mani-
festations by the employer that he favors one union over the 
other (bderna.tiorialAssn. of M. T. D. M. L. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 311 U.S. 72, 78 [61 8. Ct. 83, 85 L.Ed\ 50] 
[Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions 
may have telling effect among men who know the consequences 
of incurring that employer's strong displeasure.]; National 
Labor Relati01ls Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 
[61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368] [Intimations of an employer's 
preference, though subtle, may bc as potent as outright threats 
of discharge.] ) ; interrogation of employees as to their union 
sympathies, especially when coupled with threats of discharge 
for supporting the outside uJlion or promises of economic 
benefits for remaining loyal to the company (Top Mode Manu-
facturing Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1290-1292, affirmed, National 
Labor Relations Board v. Epstein, 203 F.2d 482 [cert. den., 
347 U.S. 912 [74 S.Ct. 474, 98 hEd. 1068]] ; Joy S1"lk Mills v. 
National Labor Relations Bom'd, 185 F.2d 732, 740 [87 App. 
D.C. 360] [cert. den., 341 U.S. 914 [71 S.Ct. 734, 95 L.Ed. 
1350]]; solicitation by management of union withdrawal 
letters (Texarkana Bus. Co. v. NatioJ/al Labor Relations Board, 
119 F.2d 480, 483; National Labor RclaN011s Board v. United 
Biscuit Co., 208 F.2d 52, 55 [cert. dell., 347 U.S. 934 [74 S.Ct. 
629, 98 L.Ed. 1085]]); unequal a(hantag-es conferred upon 
the inside union that are denied to the outside union, such as 
use of company time and property (National Labor Relations 
Board v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465,471; National Labor Relations 
" i 
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• 
Board v. Summers Fertilizer Co., 251 F.2d 514, 518); and 
hasty recognition of the inside union, as contrasted with 
marked reluctance to recognize. the outside union (National 
Labor Relata'ons Board v. Clark, 176 F.2d 341,342). Moreover, 
when an. inside union is formed behind picket lines close 
scrutiny of its genesis is required. (National Labor Relations 
Board v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 108 F.2d 867, 871 [cert. den., 
310 U.S. 651 [60 8.Ct. 1104, 84 L.Ed. 1416]] ; National Labor 
Relations Board v. Summers Fertilizer Co., supra, at 518.1 ) 
The Fourth Circuit, finding employer domination even though 
the employees signed an affidavit stating that their choice was 
not coerced, pointed out that" [s]eldom does the domination 
and interference with employee representation which the Act 
prohibits take the form of threats or coercion. More often it 
is to be found in the guise of friendly cooperation; . . ." 
(American Enka Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 
119 F.2d 60, 62.) Virtually all of these condemned activities 
occurred in the present case. The trial court's finding that 
the Association was not interfered with, dominated or con-
trolled by plaintiff can only be attributed to its failure to ap-
preciate the legal significance of plaintiff's conduct. (See 
Estate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453, 456 [159 P.2d 630] ; Sapp v. 
Barenfeld, 34 Ca1.2d 515, 518 [212 P.2d 233] ; Pacific Pipeline 
Canst. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 49 Ca1.2d 729, 735-
736 [321 P.2d 729] ; McNeil v. Board of Retirement, 51 Ca1.2d 
278,284-285 [332 P.2d 281].) 
[6] The undisputed evidence establishes plaintiff's back-
ground of hostility to any A.F.L.-C.I.O. union. Jeffrey Win-
frey, who once served as plaintiff's route supervisor, testified 
that he personally aided in installing a tape recorder in the 
drivers' locker room to discover the men's response to a uni01~ 
organizational drive in 1952, and that Otto Petri, plaintiff's 
president, instructed him not to hire any union men. Plaintiff 
has operated as a nonunion shop since approximately 1950. 
It concedes that Otto Petri is opposed to bargaining with any 
A.F.L.-C.I.O. union and that his opposition is well known to 
the employees. Of these, ten were route drivers aud twenty-
"The court's language is appropriate to this case: "It cannot be denied 
that employees have a right to ehoose either an independent unaffiliated 
union eomposed solely of fellow employees or a union affiliated with a 
national or international organization, but where sueh ehoiee oceurs after 
the initiation of organizational drives by other unions and after the 
demand for reeognition by one of these unions, any form of benefit eon-
tributed by the employer to a partie.ular union must be elosely examined." 
) 
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one worked inside the plant at cleaning, pressing, and dyeing 
machines. During June and July of 1957 defendant attempted 
to organize plaintiff's drivers, but not the inside employees. 
Nine of the drivers signed authorization cards with defendant. 
Plaintiff knew of defendant's activities, and during the first 
week in July, Otto Petri questioned Archie Fraser, one of the 
drivers, as --to his union sympathies. Fraser, a witness for 
plaintiff, testified that Petri indicated that ". . . he did not 
want to have anything to do with any union and as far as in 
his present mind, he was not going to sign a contract with any 
union or international union and that if I had taken the union 
as my choice why then I would have to go or just, either take 
the union or stay with him, have either choice." Owing to its 
coercive effect, such interrogation, coupled with a direct threat 
of discharge as a result of union membership. plainly con-
stitutes interference. Moreover, when Fraser decided to re-
nounce the union, Petri gave him a prepared letter of with-
drawal to sign. 
Around August 1, 1957, the management continued i~ co-
ercive interviews by questioning Larson and Wolford, two 
other drivers, about their union status. When they refused to 
withdraw from the union, plaintiff gave them a week's ter-
mination notice, but on August 3, 1957, placed a notice on its 
bulletin board offering them reinstatement. There is uncontra-
dicted testimony that this offer did not indicate any change in 
plaintiff's attitude. Larson testified that he refused to return 
because "Mr. Petri had made it clear to me that he wasn't 
going to accept the union so if I went back to work it would 
be under the same conditions and with no union. • . ." He 
stated that on the occasion of a subsequent visit to the plant, 
Philbert, plaintiff's manager, saw him talking to some of the 
drivers and told him that" ... he would just as soon the way 
I felt that I wouldn't remain around the plant or any of his 
drivers." Since there is no suggestion that Larson was inter-
rupting the drivers' work, this statement can only mean that 
plaintiff did not want its men exposed to union supporters. 
and, therefore. that its opposition to defendant's organiza-
tional efforts had not ceased. Wolford accepted reinstatement, 
but went on strike with the other drivers and later sought tem-
porary employment elsewhere. 
On August 6, 1957, defendant notified plaintiff by mail that 
it had authorization cards from nine of the ten drivers and 
requested a meeting with the management. At a meeting on 
) 
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August 7th, plaintiff's attorney stated that Petri would not 
recognize any union. Following this meeting with the union 
representatives, Petri called a meeting of the drivers and ex-
pressed the hope that they would work as usual the following 
day despite an expected picket line. Fraser testified that some 
of the drivers had refused to sign plaintiff's withdrawal letter 
and that he understood the purpose of the meeting was to give 
them "a last chance" to withdraw. Wolford testified that 
plaintiff's attorney stated to the drivers that plaintiff "just 
wasn't going to recognize a union as a bargaining agent." 
Thus, before the strike began, plaintiff interfered with the 
drivers' freedom of choice by compelling at least three of them 
to choose between joining the union and continuing to work 
for plaintiff. 
On the morning of August 8, 1957, eight of the ten drivers 
met in the union offices and voted unanimously to strike. One 
of them, Max Williams, had previously signed a withdrawal 
letter. When the strike began, nine of the drivers did not 
report to work. Later in the day, plaintiff delivered a truck \ 
to Fraser at his home and he drove his route that day and 
continuously thereafter. After about a week, two of the 
strikers, Williams and Cohee, returned to work. Six drivers 
who remained with the union were replaced by nonunion 
employees. 
Charles Bard, who had previously worked for plaintiff, was 
hired on August 8th as the drivers' route supervisor. Shortly 
after the strike began, he talked several times with Petri as 
well as with plaintiff's attorney and John Philbert, plaintiff's 
plant manager, about forming an inside union. They told him 
that such a union would have to be formed by the employees 
"in order for it to be legal." Petri said that the Bowen strike4 
had been broken by an inside union. Philbert asked him which 
men would be loyal to plaintiff if an inside union were formed, 
and Bard suggested Don Burns, the driver who had not signed 
'The Bowen Cleaners are located in Santa Ana and operate a business 
similar to plaintifi's. In March or April, 1957, a number of the Bowen 
route drivers went on strike to secure recognition of another union as 
their bargaining agent. Some time after the strike and peaceful picket-
ing began, an association composed of the replacement drivers was 
fonned, largely through the assistance of one R. N. Meader. Shortly 
thereafter, the company attorney (who also represents plaintifi in this 
ease) wrote to the union advising that a second union had been formed 
and recognized by the company, that a jurisdictional dispute existed, and 
instructed the union to cease picketing. When the union complied with 
that demand, no litigation resulted. 
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a union authorization card. They warned him that he could 
net initiate the formation of such a union because he was on 
the supervisory staff. 
Burns testified that he had a conversation with Petri some 
time in September and that Petri told him that" ... there was 
a man that had something to do with the Bowen strike, that he 
was negotiating with or had something to do with him, some-
thing in that manner and that he was gonna get one of the 
drivers and one of the girls in the offiee ... to meet with him 
to see if we could form a company unit." Burns further 
testified that Petri requested him to keep the conversation 
secret, that "he didn't want anyone knowing about it." Al-
though Petri testified that he did not know Meader, the outside 
organizer who had formed the employee's association at the 
Bowen plant, he did not deny that he suggested the idea of a 
company unit to Burns. Burns later refused to join the Asso-
ciation and voluntarily left plaintiff's employ during the hear-
ing. He stated that he left because "I don't think that we 
got any benefits in this company union. I don't think we are 
gonna get any benefits from it, not in my opinion." \ 
A maintenance man, Roland Matthews, testified that he 
undertook to set up an inside union, primarily" ... to get the 
plant settled down and get over the tension and so forth." He 
learned of the Bowen strike around September 1st. Shortly 
thereafter, he asked Philbert if plaintiff would negotiate with 
an independent union. Philbert told him a few days later that 
it would. Thereafter Matthews got in touch with Bowen, who 
referred him to Meader. Matthews talked to Meader on the 
telephone but they did not meet at that time. 
Some time in December Matthews read a newspaper account 
of the formation of an independent association at a laundry in 
Los Angeles. He spoke to the president of that association 
about the organization of such a group. He testified that he 
had heard a rumor that defendant's picketing of plaintiff's 
plant would increase after Christmas. He approached Petri 
and told him ". . . that I was ready to go ahead with the 
formation of the independent association if he was still in 
accord with it, and if I start what assurance would I have 
or could I assure the employees that he would take no part 
in it, meaning that there would be no discrimination against 
anyone that did take part in it, and he told me there wouldn't 
be. If I needed any farther assurance to tell them to come 
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of th~ drivers who might inquire that the inside union "met 
with the complete approval of the company." Petri's repeated 
assurances that he would recognize the Association contrasted 
with his refusal to recognize defendant made clear to the em-
ployees that plaintiff would bargain only with an unaffiliated 
organization. Thus, plaintiff forced its workers to aecept the 
organization that bore plaintiff's stamp of approval before 
it was even formed or to forego collective bargaining al-
tOl-rpther. 
Matthews made an appointment with Meader and took a 
list of the names and addresses of plaintiff's emplo:vees from 
the company bulletin board to show Meader. At thcir first 
meeting, shortly after Christmas, Meadpr told Matthews that 
his fpe for helping to organize the Petri employees would be 
$250 and inquired whether his fee would be paid by Matthews 
or Petri. Matthews paid the fee himsplf and testified that no 
OI1P had arranged to repay him. Meader selected two drivers 
and two inside employees from the list. 'Within a few days 
these four employees met with Matthews and Meader "t 
Matthews' apartment building and arranged for an organiza-
tional meeting on January 8, 1958. Plaintiff refused Matthews' 
request to hold the meeting on company property. He then 
arranged to rent a hall a block away from the plant for the 
meeting. A few days before the meeting, he spoke to Burns 
about joining the Association. Burns stated that Matthews 
". . . asked me if I was interested in getting the pickets off 
the front .... " Matthews also circulated a petition among' the 
employees stating: "We the undersigned agree to go along 
with the majority in forming an Independent Laundry and 
Dry Cleaning Association of driver salesmen and plant em-
ployees of Petris Cleaners." Of 18 employees who sigued the 
petition, Archie Fraser was the only driver. 
Normally the men stayed on their routes, either malting 
deliveries or soliciting new cnstomers, lin til 5 p.m. Bard tes-
tified that Philbert instructed him to tell the drivers to come 
in at 4 p.m. January 8th to attend the meeting and that" ... 
he smiled and said, 'We are not supposcd to know anything 
about this meeting.' " Bard and Philbert, pursuant to Petri's 
orders, walked around the building in which the meeting was 
being held to prevent troubl<>. That the Association's organiza-
tional meeting was guarded by plaintiff's manag<>r and its 
supervisor indicates plaintiff's interest in having the inside 
unit formed. ( Compare National Labor RelaNons Board v. 
... 
) 
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Vesmont American Furn. Corp., 182 F.2d 842, 843-844, hold-
ing the presence of employer's plant manager, treasurer and 
superintendent in a hotel lounge adjacent to a lobby in which 
the outside union was holding an organizational meeting im-
proper surveillance by the employer.) 
The meeting, which began at 5 p.m., was attended by all 
eight drivers, four of whom had replaced the strikers, and 
about seven of the inside employees. Meader explained the 
method of organization. The group agreed upon a single or-
ganization with two separate bargaining units and elected 
Archie Fraser chairman for the drivers and Matthews chair-
man for the inside workers. Meader gave Matthews a form 
letter to use in demanding recognition. Matthews took the 
letter to plaintiff's main office around 6 p.m. and one of plain-
tiff's employees typed a copy of the letter. Matthews then gave 
it to Petri. At that time, none of the drivers except Archie 
Fraser had stated in writing that he wished to join the As-
sociation. 
Plaintiff's attorney notified defendant in a letter da'ed 
January 9, 1958, that "as of this date a contract has been 
entered into" between plaintiff and the Association; that "all 
of the employees of Petri Cleaners, Inc., are members of said 
Association"; and that defendant's picketing constituted a 
violation of the Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
Bard testified that on January 10th a letter arrived from 
plaintiff's attorney addressed to Otto Petri. Petri then sent 
for Archie Fraser and told him to sign a certain paper. Fraser 
did so, and upon leaving Petri's office met one of the drivers 
who asked him what he had signed. After a short discussion, 
Fraser returned to Petri's office to reread the paper and told 
the driver it was a recognition agreement. Fraser's statement 
" ... started off a bombshell in the back because the drivers 
said that nobody had given Archie authority to sign anything 
like that. " 
The agreement, dated January 9th, provides that plaintiff 
recognizes the Association ., as the exclusive collective bargain-
ing agency for all route salesmen," that plaintiff promises" to 
sit down and consult with said Association and attempt to 
arrive at a working agreement controlling wages, hours and 
working conditions and other fringe benefits" and not to 
recognize any other labor organization for a period of 120 days 
and that the Association promises not to strike or affiliate with 
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cross-examination that he had not requested any of the terms 
of this contract except the recognition clause and that none of 
its provisions were submitted to the other employees for their 
approval. 
On January 14, 1958, plaintiff called a meeting of all its 
employees during working hours. At that time, plaintiff's 
counsel asked them all to sign an affidavit stating that they 
belonged to the Association; that the Association was "freely 
and voluntarily formed by the undersigned employees, with-
out coercion, financial aid, domination, or interference from 
Petri Cleaners, Inc."; and that they did not wish to be rep-
resented by defendant. Bard testified that he stated to the 
group that he would not sign the affidavit at that time if he 
were a driver. All the drivers were present, but only two signed 
the affidavit. Following the meeting, Philbert asked Bard why 
he had influenced the drivers not to sign when their signatures 
would be favorable to the company. Bard stated that he 
thought the drivers should not relinquish their sole weaI\on, 
and Philbert did not reply. 
After obtaining the affidavit, plaintiff commenced this action 
on January 14th, and requested a temporary restraining order 
to remove the pickets. The court denied plaintiff's request 
after defendant's attorney contended that the absence of any 
contract covering wages, hours or working conditions created 
doubt as to the bona fides of the Association. At about 5 :30 
p.m. of the same day, Petri conferred with his attorney, and 
then seut for Archie Fraser. Petri told Fraser that he wanted 
to negotiate a contract with the drivers immediately, and asked 
Fraser to submit a list of suggestions by J auuary 15th. 
Fraser's request for an additional day was granted. On Janu-
ary 15th a meeting of all employees and a separate meeting 
of the drivers were advertised on the company bulletin board 
and held on company property-privileges extended to the 
Association, but not to defendant. Bard again instructed the 
drivers to return to the plant at 4 p.m. At the first meeting, 
hf'ld after 5 p.m., Meader presented forms of a constitution, 
bylaws, and a union contract. These documents were turned 
over to a committee. At their own meeting, the drivers made 
individual written suggestions, which Fraser compiled and 
submitted to plaintiff. 
On January 16th all the drivers but one met from 6 to 9 :30 
p.m. on company property with Petri, Philbert, plaintiff's at-
torney and Bard, the route supervisor. Bard testified that one 
I 
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of the drivers asked why the negotiations were being pushed 
so fast and stated that" ... the whole thing to him appeared 
that it was just a matter of, a question of getting the pickets 
off and getting very little back in return for it/' Later, plain-
tiff's attorney stated that" ... he would get the papers back 
as quickly as possible because-in order that everybody could 
sign the contract in order to present-to give a strouger case 
in court. ,. Discussion centered around the drivers' suggestions 
and the Bowen contract as a model. Plaintiff's attorne~ 
stated that he would draft a contract in line with the under· 
standing of the group. The haste with which plaintiff signed a 
contract with the drivers stands out in striking contrast with 
the fact that there have been no negotiations, and no plans for 
any between the inside plant employees and the company. 
Bard also testified that the next morning Philbert ". . • 
called me outside and said he'd like to thank me for the help 
that I had given them on a couple of points and that he and Mr. 
Petri.had been afraid prior to that that I was definitely on the 
wrong side and influencing the drivers in the wrong way and 
they were glad to see that I had taken a different attitude at 
that meeting." This conversation was the third that Bard 
reported between him and Philbert. The first, it will be re-
called, was Philbert's instruction that Bard advise the drivers 
that plaintiff completely approved of the Association. The 
necond took place after the presentation of plaintiff's affidavit. 
when Philbert asked Bard why he had influenced the drivers 
not to sign the document. The clear purport of these conver-
sations between plaintiff's plant manager and its route super-
visor was to urge Bard to influence the drivers to support 
plaintiff against defendant. Bard testified for defendant under 
subpoena. He stated that Petri informed him prior to his 
appearance as a witness that Petri was considering the aboli-
tion of his job as route supervisor, but that Bard could take 
one of the routes if any were available. 
Plaintiff received a draft of the contract on January 20th. 
Although dated January 20th, it was not signed by the drivers 
or the company until the morning of January 22nd, the date 
of the hearing on the order to show cause. Petri testified that 
he wanted the contract dated February 3rd, but ·the drivers 
wanted it effective January 20th. Of the seven drivers who 
signed the contract, three were among the original ten drivers 
and four were replacements of the strikers. The contract con-
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clause, a promise by the Association not to affiliate with any 
othe~ labor organization, and provisions relating to wages, 
hours, vacations and holidays. 
The undisputed evidence, Ii viewed in light of our interpreta-
tion of section 1117, establishes as a matter of law that plaintiff 
,. interfered with" the Association. Thus, to reiterate onl;\' the 
more obvious of plaintiff's departures from its required role 
of impartiality, its president and plant manager conducted 
coercive interrogations, giving several drivers the •• choice" 
of renouncing union membership or being discharged; plain-
tiff provided its drivers with a prepared letter of withdrawal 
from defendant's organization and initially discharged two 
drivers who refused to withdraw; plaintiff repeatedly an-
nounced that it would not bargain with defendant, while at the 
same time encouraging the formation of the Association 
through its assurances that the inside group enjoyed plaintiff's 
complete approval, and plaintiff permitted the Association 
to use its property and bulletin board at all meetings follow-
ing the organizational meeting-a privilege it did not extend 
to defendant. 
Since plaintiff's conduct clearly constitutes interference, 
the Association was not a labor organization within the mean-
ing of section 1117. There was therefore no jurisdictional 
strike under section 1118 and the order granting a preliminary 
injunction against defendant's strike must be reversed. 
The question remains whether the trial court erred in deny-
ing defendant's motion for a preliminary injunction to compel 
plaintiff to recognize defendant as the exclusive bargaining 
agent for plaintiff's drivers. 
An employer's decision whether or not to bargain with a 
labor organization has long been determined in this state by 
the free interaction of economic forces. Early cases established 
the legality of concerted activities for proper labor objectives 
under common law principles (J. F. Parkinson Co. v. Building 
Tra.des Council, 154 Cal. 581, 599-600 [98 P. 1027,16 Ann.Cas. 
1165, 21 L.R.A. N.S. 550] ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 
Cal. 70, 75-76 [103 P. 324]). Sections 920-923 of the Labor 
'Plaintiff's reliance upon its affidal'lts to raise a conflict is misplaced 
because its affidavits are drawn in concluslonary terms. Affidavits that 
merely stat.e conclusions of law are not el'ldence (Moon v. Moon, 62 Cal. 
App.2d 185, 187 [144 P.2d 590); People v. Thomp8on, 5 Cal.App.2d 0:;5, 
064 [43 P.2d 600» and do not create a conflict as to the facts (Coen Y. 
Watson, 105 Cal.App. 297,300 [287 P. 525J). 
) 
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Codes imposed certain restrictions on the employer only "to 
balll.nce the industrial equation, so far as it is possible to do so, 
by placing employer and employee on an equal basis." 
(Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Ca1.2d 379, 385 
[106 P.2d 403].) [7] Thus, section 921 provides that 
promises embodied in yellow-dog contracts shall not be en-
forced. Section .922 provides that any person who coerces 
another to enter into such a contract as a condition of em-
ployment is guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 923 announces 
it the public policy of this state "to uphold the freedom of 
employees to organize and enter into collective bargaining 
contracts for their own protection." (Levy v. Superior Court, 
15 Ca1.2d 692, 704 [104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R. 956].) These 
·Section 920: "As used in this chapter, unless the eon text otherWise 
indicates, 'promise' includes promise, undertaking, eontract, or agreu· 
ment, whether written or oral, express or implied." 
Section 921: "Every promise made after August 21, 1933, between 
any employee or prospective employee and his employer, prospective em· 
ployer or any other person is eontrary to public policy if either party 
thereto promises any of the following: 
"(a) To join or to remain a member of a labor organization or to join 
or remain a member of an employer organization, 
"(b) Not to join or not to remain a member of a labor organization 
or of an employer organization. • 
"(e) To withdraw from an employment relation in the event that be 
joins or remains a member of a labor organization or of an employur 
organization. 
"Such promise shall not afford any basis for the granting of legal or 
equitable relief by any court against a party to such promise, or against 
any other persons who advise, urge, or induce, without fraud or violence 
or threat thereof, either party thereto to act in disregard of suell 
promise." 
Section 922: "Any person or agent or oftic.er thereof who coerces or 
eompels any person to enter into an agreement, written or verbal, not to 
join or become a member of any labor organization, as a condition of 
securing employment or eontinuing in the employment of any such person 
is guilty of a misdemeanor." . 
Section 923: "In the interpretation and application of this chapter, 
the public policy of this State is declared as follows: 
"Negotiation of terms and eonditions of labor should result fronl 
voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental 
authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the 
corporate and other forms of capital control. In dealing with such em-
ployers, the individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual 
liberty of contract and to protect his free<lom of labor, and thereby to 
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore it id 
necessary that the individual workman have full freedom of association, 
self·organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, 
t.o negotiate the terms and eonditions of his employment, and that he shall 
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, 
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-
organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of eollective 
bar&"ainin&" or other mutual aid or protection." 
) 
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sections do not preclude promises to join independent labor 
organ~zations (Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, supra, 
at 386-387), closed or union shop contracts, or concerted 
activities to obtain such contracts. (McKay v. Reta,a, Auto. 
S. L. Union No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311, 327 [106 P.2d 373]; 
Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, supra, at 387; C. S. 
Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 396 [106 P.2d 
414] ; Park & T. I. Corp. v. Inter11ational etc. of Teamsters, 
27 Ca1.2d 599, 609-612 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].) 
Neither do they place on the employer an affirmative duty to 
bargain, as the opening sentence of section 923 makes clear: 
"Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result 
from voluntary agreement between employer and employees." 
An employer faced with a union's demand for recognition 
still has "the choice of yielding to the union's demands or 
continuing to endure the interference with its business rela-
tions which the (union's) activi~ies caused." (C. S. Smith 
Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, supra, at 397.) 
[8] The Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-
1120, 1122)7 was designed, not to diminish free competition 
~Seetion 1115: ' 'A jurisdictional strike as berein defined is bereby 
dee1ared to be against the public policy of the State of California and is 
bereby deelared to be unlawful." . 
Seetion 1116: "Any person injured or tbreattned with injury by vio· 
lation of any of the provisions hereof shall be entitled to injunctive relief 
therefrom in a proper case, and to recover any damages resulting there· 
from in any court of competent jurisdiction." 
Seetion 1117: "As used herein, 'labor organization' means any organi. 
zation or any agency or employee representation committee or any local 
unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists for the purpose, 
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor 
disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work, which labor 
organization is not found to be or to have been financed in wbole or in 
part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer or any 
employer association within one year of the commencement of any pro· 
eeeding brought under this chapter. The plaintiff man bave the affirma· 
tive of the issue with respect to establishing the existence of a 'labor 
organization' as defined herein. 
"As used herein, 'person' means any person, association, organization, 
partnership, corporation, unincorporated association, or labor organiza· 
tion. " 
Section 1118: "As used in this chapter, 'jurisdictional strike' means 
a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer or any other con· 
certed interference with an employer's operation or business, arising out 
of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which 
of them has or should have the,exclusive right to bargain collectively with 
an employer on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of 




PETRI CLEANERS, INC. v. AUTOMOTIVE 
E:r.fPLOYEES, ETC., I,ocAL No. 88 
[53 C.2d 
between labor and industry, but to release an innocent em-
ployer caught between the rival claims of two or more labor 
organizations. It does not apply unless there are at least two 
"labor organizations" within the meaning of section 1117, and 
the prohibited actiyity arises out of a dispute between them 
as to which has the exclusive right to bargain with an employer 
or to have its members work for him. (Lab. Code, § 1118; 
Seven-Up etc: -Co. v.· Groc"ery etc. Union, 40 Cal.2d 368, 381 
[254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R. 327].) The employer may not only 
enjoin a jurisdictional strike (Lab. Code, § 1116) but refuse 
to bargain with either organization. 
[9] It is for the Legislature to determine whether volun-
tary bargaining should now be displaced by a rule compelling 
the eiuployer to bargain with the representatives of a majority 
of his employees. Recognizing that trial courts are hardly 
labor relations boards, defendant requests affirmative relief, 
avowedly because the record is so clear as to raise only issues 
of law. But, as the United States Supreme Court observed 
of a similar argument, •• we write not only for this case and 
this day alone, but for this type of case." (Carroll v. Lanza, 
349 U.S. 408, 413 [75 S.Ct. 804, 99 L.Ed. 1183].) A host of 
problems attend compulsory bargaining ~at only the Legis-
lature can resolve. What constitutes an appropriate bar-
gaining unit' (See §§ 8 (a) (3) (i); 9 (b) ; 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 
159.) How is the majority's choice to be determined f (See 
§ 9 (c) (1); 29 U.S.C., § 159.) Which employees constitute 
the relevant majority, those presently employed or those 
employed at the time the employer's refusal to bargain preci-
pitated the strike' Congress recently changed the federal 
definition of the relevant majority. The Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947 provided that "Employees on strike who 
are not entitled to reinstatement shall not be eligible to vote." 
them has or mould have the exclusive right to have its members perform 
work for an employer." 
Section 1119: "Nothing in this chapter mall be construed to inter-
fere with collective bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein Bet 
forth, nor to prohibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining 
a member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any 
other individual to join a labor organization." . ..... 
Section 1122: •• Any person who organizes an employee group which is 
financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated, or eontrollpd 
by the employer or any employer association, as well as such emplOYflr 
or employer association, shall be liable to suit by any person who is 
Dljured thereby. Said injured party shall recover the damages Bustarued 
by him and the costs of Buit." 
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(§ 9 (c) (3); 29 U.S.C., § 159.) Dissatisfaction with this rule 
(see, e.g., Right to Vote During an Economic Strike, 16 U. of 
ChLL.Rey. 537) led to the 1959 provision that "Employees 
engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstate-
ment shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the 
Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and pro-
visions of this Act in any election conducted within twelve 
months after the commencement of the strike." (Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 702.) The enforcement of the duty to bargain under the 
federal act has been practicable only because the necessary 
administrative machinery and statutory guides have been pro-
vided. This court cannot usurp legislative power by enacting 
rules of law patterned on the Labor Management Relations 
Act, and it cannot create the administrative machinery neces-
sary to make such rules workable. 
Defendant contends, however, that three decisions of this 
court lead to compulsory bargaining. (Garmon v. San Diego 
Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Ca1.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473] ; Chavez 
v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801] ; Rctail Clerks' UnUm 
v. Superior Court, 52 Ca1.2d 222 [339 P.2d 839].) By rein-
terpreting section 923 of the Labor Code and Invoking the 
Jurisdictional Strike Act, the court in the Gth-mon case held 
that a closed or union shop contract is au unlawful labor 
objective under state law when none of the employees wish 
to join or be represented by the union. The court's conclusion 
that by signing a closed or union shop agreement the em-
ployer would interfere with his employees' rights "in the 
designation of ... representatives or in self-organization or in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection" (Lab. Code, § 923) in 
violation of section 923 was directly contrary to the settled rule 
that section 923 does not restrict the right of labor to ellgage 
in concerted activity to attain a closed or union shop. (Shafer 
v. Re.gistercd Pharmacists Union, supra, at 387.) Furthermore, 
the Garmon case was decided on the erroneous assumption that 
the conduct found tortions under state law was also illegal 
under federal law, and it was reversed on the question of 
federal pre-emption in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. 
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ecl.2d 775J. 
In Chavez v. Sargent, supra, this court departed from rules 
based on the free interaction of economic forces and deter-
mined that collective bargaining must be pursued or not ac-
) 
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cording to the wishes of the majority of the employees directly 
involved. Under the reasoning of that case, the employer 
cannot interfere with the majority's freedom of self-organiza-
tion by agreeing to bargain with any agent other than the 
majority's chosen representative. It follows that he may not 
stultify the majority's choice by refusing to bargain at all. 
Otherwise, the requirement of majority rule, instead of aiding 
the majority's efforts for <'.Ollective bargaining, would benefit 
only the employer who could defeat the efficacy of the ma-
jority's choice of a representative. Unless the employer recog-
nizes the majority's chosen representative, he necessarily 
interferes with the majority's freedom of choice by preventing 
its practical culmination. 
In undertaking to restate the labor law of California, how-
ever, the Chavez case went beyond the issue before the court. 
To support the holding that the local ordinance there involved 
was invalid, it was necessary only to decide that concerted 
activity to secure closed or union shop contracts and contracts 
resulting therefrom were protected as part of the workman '8 
"full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of his own choosing." (Lab. Code, 
§ 923.) By going further and setting up a new system of 
labor law based on majority rule insteac1 of the free interaction 
of economic forces, the case would turn our trial courts into 
labor relations boards without legislative guidance or necessary 
administrative machinery. 
These difficulties may not have been foreseen when the dicta 
in Chavez were applied in Retail Ole1'ks' Union v. Superior 
Court, supra, to enjoin concerted activity that was theretofore 
clearly legal. Since none of the employees there involved had 
designated the picketing unions as their bargaining representa-
tives, no problem of determining the relevant majority was 
presented. The problems that lay dormant in this negative 
application of the Chavez case cannot be escaped, however, 
when, as in this case, its positive corollaries are sought to be 
enforced. In this type of case, the trial court is asked to sit as 
a labor board and thus determine the appropriateness of 
bargaining units, conduct elections, certify the majority rep-
resentative, and direct collective bargaining. 
[10] We conclude that employers are not required by 
law to engage in collective bargainiug and that closed or 
union shop agreements and concerted actiyities to achieve them 
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ployees directly involved wish such agreements. If a contrary 
rule is to be established, the Legislature, not this court, must 
enact it. The Garmon and Retail Clerks' Union cases are, 
therefore, overruled. Insofar as it is inconsistent with the 
views expressed herein, the Chavez case is disapproved. 
The order granting plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is 
reversed and the order denying defendant's motion for in-
junctive relief is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-On May 19, 1959, in Chavez 
v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801], we reviewed the 
policy and effect of section 923 of the Labor Code and related 
statutes (Lab. Code, §§ 920-923, 1115-1122, 1126), and a 
majority of this court recognized the following propositions: 
"[Pp. 186-187 [14] of 52 Cal.2d.] It is of primary im-
portance that the individual workman have protection-that 
he have' full frecdom' of 'self-association' and in the designa-
tion of representatives of 'his own choosing.' But it is also 
essential that the group's lawfully selected negotiators have 
power and freedom of contract to secure the workman's in-
terests by contract with employers, and that for the ultimate 
benefit of each individual workman the authorized representa-
tive shall be able to wield the collectivf' power of all .... 
"[P. 197 [29] id.] If employes have voluntarily become 
members of any' labor organization' (not financed or interfered 
with by their employer, Lab. Code, § 1117) and have thereby 
or therein selected and authorized a bargaining agent, such 
agent and the employer are free to bargain for the respective 
legitimate objectives of both workmen and employer. The 
ensuing collective agreement may, of course, include provisions 
for union security, such as a union shop, maintenance of 
membership, and exclusive bargaining rights with the em-
ployer. " . 
" [Po 198 [32] id.] The right of the workman to participate 
in the selection of his bargaining agent and in the government 
of his union is the workman's right of self-determination. 
Organization and collective bargaining are but tools to that 
end .... 
"[P. 203 [37] id.] It is a primary rule that 'courts are 
bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary 
) 
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import of the language employed in framing them.' (In t'e 
Alpi1ic (1928), 203 Cal. 731, 737 [3] [265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 
1500].J ... 
" I Pp. 205-206 145, 46] id.l For an employer to notify 
his employes that he has agreed with a union which is, and 
which he knOWl> to be, unauthorized and unwanted by his em-
ployes, that they must join such union and be represented 
by it or be dismissed from employment would appear to con-
stitute an unlawful interference hy the employer and subject 
him to the liability imposed by section 1122 . 
•• Industrial self-government is a goal to be desired. Inso-
far as problems arise over issues which are not specifically 
covered by legislation they should be • solved by looking to the 
policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will 
effectuate that policy.' (See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln 
Mills (1957), ... 353 U.S. 448, 457 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 
972].) ... 
"[P. 212, footnote 14, id.] It should be noted that where an 
organization which has been fairly selected by the majority 
vote of all the employes of an employer (or of an affected craft 
or group) seeks union security [or other lawful objective],-
the organization acting for all such employes may use lawful 
forms of pressure (e.~., the strike, picketing, etc.) to induce 
the employer to grant'that condition of labor. From what has 
hereinabove been said in the discussion of sections 921 and 
923 it is ob"ious that the freedom declared is the freedom from 
employer interference in such matters as association, organiza-
tion and selection of representatives, to the end that through 
the democratically chosen representatives collective bargaining 
agreements may be negotiated. The workmen, having had the 
opportunity to freely participate in such procedures, are, of 
course, bound by the majority vote, and the contract negotiated 
will be the contract of all .... " 
Today a differently constituted majority disapprove those 
views and overrule Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Oouncil 
(1958), 49 Cal.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473], and Retail Olerks' 
U11ion v. Superior Oourt (1959), 52 Cal.2d 222 [339 P.2d 
839]. Of course, as a matter of law, the majority possess the 
power to overrule the above cited cases. They have so used 
that power; whether wisely or otherwise remains to be seen. 
It is my view that the majority action inevitably will set 
back, for we know not how long nor how repercussively, the 
cause of law-guided and peacefully negotiated settlements of 
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labor disputes in California industry.l I think that by the 
majority's action workmcn will suffer; employers will suffer; 
the public will suffer; unions and union leaders who prefer 
self-government under law will suffer; only those union or-
ganizers who eschew responsibility under law and who have 
110 regard for the general welfare and freedom of the indi-
vidual workman will prosper .• 
Each of those facts appears implicit in the express "dis-
approval" of Ohavez v. Sargent and the overruling of Garmon 
and Retail Clerks' Union. Prominent among the Chavez 
and Garmon rulings which are disapproved and overruled 
is the holding that it is unlawful for an employer to make a 
contract with a labor "organizer" who represents none of 
the affected employes whereby the employer agrees that h!' 
will compel his workmen, on pain of discharge, to join the 
organizer's union and to "consent" that the employer shall 
deduct "dues" from the employes' pay checks for remittance 
to their "organizer"-their unchosen and unwanted "rep-
resentative." The majority's ruling means also that if the 
employer does not voluntarily agree to sign such contract, 
when demanded by the "organizer," the latter may place 
pickets around 'the employer's plant and damage or destroy 
the business. Thus "blackmail picketing" is restored in 
California. 
Not only do the new majority disapprove or overrule the 
cited cases; they also hold that Labor Code, section 923, either 
does not mean what its words say or that it is unenforcible 
for want of further statutory implementation. The eRsential 
words of section 923 as enacted by the Legislature are: " [T] he 
public policy of this State is declared as follows: Negotiation 
of terms and conditions of labor should result from volun-
tary agreement between employer and employees. . . • In 
1The overruling today of Garmon, resulting in re-creation of a "no-
man's land" in California, seems peculiarly lamentable because under 
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 it is ex-
pressly provided that the state courts shall be competent to exercise juris-
diction in the "no-man 's land" which formerly existed when the Nationnl 
Labor Relations Board refused to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute. 
Bueh as that in Garmon, whieh affected interstate commerce. (Garmon v. 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Oouncil (1958), supra, 49 Cal.2d 595, 598.) 
Section 14(c) (2) of the Na.tional Labor Relations Act now provides 
that "Nothing in this Aet [National Labor Relations Act as a.mendedl 
shall be deemed to prevent or bar ... the courts of any State •.. from 
assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the 
Board declines ••• to assert jurisdiction. ' , 
. 
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dealing with. . . employers, the individual unorganized 
worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and 
to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain ac-
ceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore it 
is necessary that the individual workman have full freedom 
of association, sel~organization, and desig1UJtio-n of repre-
sentatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from 
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, 
or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or 
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection." (Italics added.) Those words and the policy they 
enunciate seem clear enough to me to be understandable and 
enforcible. 
But the new majority say, "It is [still] for the Legislature 
to determine whether voluntary bargaining should now be 
displaced by a rule compelling the employer to bargain with 
the representative of a majority of his employees." (P. 472 
~ [9], ante.) "Voluntary bargaining," the new majority further 
hold, may be bargaining not even participated in by the 
workmen but solely between an employer coerced by picketing 
or threats of picketing and an "organizer" who represents 
none of the affected employes but who wants to add them 
to his <\lIes-paying but non-franchised constituency-his stock 
in trade. 
The new majority hold that in California the employes 
need not be permitted to participate in selecting "their 
OVI'D" bargaining representatives; that such employes, if the 
"organizer" and employer so agree, must accept the un-
wanted organizer (or his union, if in fact he represents any 
existing organization) as their "representative" or be dis-
charged from employment. This action by the employer, the 
majority hold, notwithstanding the provisions of Labor Code, 
sections 923 and 11172 and related sections, does not con-
stitute "interference" by the employer. Such majority hold 
that section 923 cannot be enforced because" A host of prob-
'Section 1117 provides, "As used herein [Jurisdictional Strike Law}, 
'labor organization' means any organization or any agency or employee 
represent.ation committee or any local unit thereof in which employees 
participate, and exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of 
employment or conditions of work, which labor organization is not found 
to be or to have been 1Inaneed in whole or in pari, interfered with, domi-. 
nated or controlled by the employer or any employer association within 1 
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lems attend compulsory bargaining [if attempted by em-
ployes but not if conducted by a self-appointed "organizer"] 
that only the Legislature can resolve. [The host of insur-
mountable problems are:] What constitutes an appropriate 
bargaining unit' . . • How is the majority's choice to be 
determined f • • • Which employees constitute the relevant 
majority ... f" (P. 472, ante.) Therefore, it is held, the 
"individual workman," whose "full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his 
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his 
employment" is so unequivocally expressed in section 923, 
is in truth not even entitled to vote in the selection of his 
bargaining representative. In my opinion, as explained in 
more detail infra, p. 494 et seq., the courts of California 
are capable of dealing with these and related problems and 
refusal to undertake solution of such problems is a gratui-
tous and unwarranted assertion of judicial impotence. 
It is to be observed that the demanding organizer's union 
(assuming that he actually represents an already existing 
organization) which, by the majority holding, may properly 
force the employer both to bargain with it and to force his 
unwilling employes to join, need not be a genuine, reputable 
labor organization in any sense of the word. It need not 
give the employes who are compelled to accept it as their 
representative any voice in the terms of employment which 
it negotiates for them or any choice as to what officer or 
agent of the union shall speak for them in the negotiations. 
All the employe need receive from the union is the "right" 
to carry a union card in return for the "privilege" and 
"duty" of paying dues, together with such rights as the 
courts somehow have managed in the past to recognize and 
protect without statutory guidance (e.g., the right not to be 
arbitrarily excluded from union membership where the union 
has attained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means 
of closed shop agreements (James v. Marinship Corp. (1944), 
25 Cal.2d 721, 730-731 [4] [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]) 
and the right not to be disciplined or expelled from the union 
without notice, hearing, opportunity to confront and cross-
examine his accusers and to examine and refute the evidence 
one year of the commencement of any proceeding brought under this 
cllapter. The plainti1f shall have the affirmative of the issue with respect 
to establishing the existence of a 'labor organization' 8S defined 
herein .••• " 
) 
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against him (Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn. (1951), 37 
Cal.2d 134, 143-144 [12, 14, 15] [321 P.2d 6, 21 A.L.R.2d 
1387]). 
The present majority's concept of what constitutes "free-
dom" of self-organization and "voluntary" bargaining, it 
seems to me, is definitely opposed not only to the statutes 
of California but also to widely expressed recent thinking in 
the field of labor-management-individual-workman relations, 
as evidenced, for example, by the federal IJabor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. That act provides, 
among other things, a "Bill of Rights[S] of Members of Labor 
Organizations, " with the following requirements: 
Section 101 (a) (1) : "Every member of a labor organization 
shall have equal rights and privileges within such organiza-
tion to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or refenden-
dums of the labor organization, to attend membership meet-
ings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon 
the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and 
regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws." 
Section 101 (a) (2) : "Every member of any labor organi-
zation shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with 
other members; and to express any views . . ., and to express 
at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candi-
dates in an election of the labor organization or upon any 
business properly before the meeting, subject to the organi-
zation's established and reasonable rules . • ." 
Members are given a voice, either by direct vote or vote 
of their representatives, as to increase of dues or levy of 
assessments, "[e]xcept in the case of a federation of national 
or international labor organizations" (§ 101 (a) (3»; their 
right to sue in the courts or seek relief before administrative 
agencies is protected (§ 101(a) (4»; and it is provided that 
they cannot be disciplined except for nonpayment of dues 
"In ClwweSl v. Sargent (1959), .vpra, 52 Cal.2d 162, 194 [27] it ill Doted 
that" As Dearly as labor may be said to have a governmentally declared 
Bill of Rights in California, it is that enunciated in lection 923. It is 
that section which undertakes to insure to each individual workman free· 
dom to BSlociate, to organize, to select representatives to negotiate for 
his group, and through those representatives and the strength of his 
organization, to bargain collectively. In particular it is that section which 
provides for the workman whatever democraey there may be in his union." 
The most fundamental of the same elements of protection to workmen 
as are defined in the 1959 federal act were in California's Bill of Rights 
(enumerated in Lab. Code, t 923, and related Bections) as recognized and 
upheld (until disapproved today) in Cha1!8SI v. Stwge'll.t. (Bee id., 
pp. 191·192 [20-16].) 
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without being served with specific written charges, given 
reasonable time to prepare a defense, and afforded a full and 
fair hearing (§ ]Ol(a) (5)). 
Specifically I note that no statutory scheme for protecting 
the foregoing rights is spelled out; the union member is 
simply given the right to "bring a civil action in a district 
court of the United States for such relief (including injunc-
tions) as may be appropriate" (§ 102). As hereinabove in-
dicated, under California law, until today, the workman in 
intrastate commerce had in state courts an equivalent remedy 
for substantially similar rights. 
1 would also mention at this point that, adding to the 
difficulty of the California employe who is not subject to 
the federal labor acts is the further holding of the majority 
(hereinafter more fully discussed) that "when an inside 
union is formed behind picket lines close scrutiny of its 
genesis is required." (P. 461, ante.) Thus the invading 
union, however corrupt it may be, is, under the majority 
opinion, apparently subject to no scrutiny, but when it throws 
a picket line around a shop which the employes have chosen 
to keep unorganized, any labor organization formed by those 
employes in self-defense is suspect and likely, under the ma-
jority view, to be held to be a company-interfered-with group 
as a matter of law. As hereinafter explicitly shown, the ma-
jority today exemplify that principle and, by the extreme 
expedient of resolving conflicts in the evidence contrary to 
the resolution thereof by the trial judge, reach a directly 
contrary judgment. 
One of the most important elements of the state's labor 
policy which is expressed in Labor Code, section 923-and 
which is today held unenforcible-is the provision for com-
plete freedom of workmen in self-organization and selection 
of representatives of their own choosing. That element is 
important not only to give workmen the right of self-govern-
ment in their own organization but also to guard against 
the rash acts which experience has taught us are likely to 
tome from the concentration of unbridled power in one man 
or a small dominated group. The most basic principle of the 
California plan is destroyed when the right of direct control 
is taken from the workmen and given to a self-appointed or-
~alljzer. The latter thus is enthroned not as a representative 
of the workmen but as their boss. 
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of 52 Cal.2d, it is altogether clear that there are individual 
labor leaders and some followers who are averse to regula-
tion by law or to the settlement of labor disputes through 
the judicial process. Illustrative of the preference by some 
labor leaders for settlement of disputes by means other than 
the relatively peaceful and restrained judicial process, and 
of the tactics to which they will resort when, for whatever 
reason, they eSChew the law, are the facts in People v. Osslo 
(1958), 50 Ca1.2d 75 [323 P.2d 397].4 
·The Osslo decision affirms judgments of conviction of conspiracy to· 
commit assault and of aggravated assault, arising out of a dispute in 
San Diego between the Clerks' union, which handled retail sales of frozen 
dinners, and the Butchers' union, which sought jurisdiction of such sales. 
The defendant.s were Osslo <an official of the Butchers' local, of the 
affiliated but.chers' unions of California, anel of the International 
Butchers' union), two business agents of the Butchers' local, and five 
men (Hazel, a Teamster, and Dimitratos, Cacio, Tucker, and Dempster, 
members of the Sailors Union of the Pacific) imported by 08s10 from 
San Francisco through the Sailors Union and employed to act in con· 
nection with the dispute. (P. 89 of 50 Ca1.2d.) "Representatives of the 
Butchers and the Clerks met [to discuss their conflicting claims] .•• The 
secretary·treasurer of the Clerks' local 'made demand upon Mr. Osslo 
••• to have the merchandise in dispute ••• placed back under the juris· 
diction of the Clerks, or our organization would take t:1Jery legal meaf18 
necessary to enforce the jurisdiction.' (Italics added.) Osslo 'pounded 
the table three times, stated he was boss of the West Coast and he would 
fight for jurisdiction .••• [Four days before the assault] the Clerks 
filed with the National Labor Relations Board a petition 'for the purpose 
of having the Board determine who jurisdiction belonged to.' " Busi. 
ness agents of the Butchers, with the imported sailors, "started calling 
on the markets." (Pp. 83·84 of 50 Ca1.2d.) 
During one of tbeir visits to a market, as described by an eye witness 
and recounted in the opinion (p. 92 of 50 Oa1.2d), "These five defend· 
ants [the sailors] surrounded Clerks Montgomery and Maurer and some 
of the defendants stomped on Montgomery's and Maurer's feet. 
'Dimitratos and Hazel attempt[ed] to get Montgomery, but he ••• 
[though pursued] got away and tbey stepped right back out ••. Maurer 
couldn't get ••• past the customers because of a railing and a bunch of 
pushcarts •.. and he was being pursued ... until two men got hold of 
him and held him • . .' Cacio stmck Maurer in the stomach. Dempster 
and Tucker pinned Maurer's arms to his sides. 'Dimitratos judo chopped 
bim terribly, fift.een or twenty shots,' and 'Hazel was bombing in with 
bis fists and lIith judo chops.' Maurer was beaten and kicked. '[W]hen 
they let go and dropped him to the floor he was in kind of a hulk lying 
on bis side. That is when Cacio used the boots on him .... Kicked him 
in the back twice and then he flopped over on his bac.k and he was kicked, 
I think, right in the side terribly hard.' " 
nlustrating situations in which a union and its officers set in motion 
a picket plan, encouraged or evidenced irresponsibility in controlling and 
disregard of their duty to control their members' resort to violenee and 
intimidation in violation of court order, and then Bought to evade legal 
responsibility for the acts of the rank and file, are 8teiner v. LOfI,g Beach 
I,oeal No. 188 (1942),19 Ca1.2d 676, 685-686 [6, 7] [123 P.2d 20] [union 
officers were present and directed picketing which included disorder and 
. -) 
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The present majority of this court make it clear that they 
consider that the courts are powerless to protect the rights 
of the individual workmen and their freely chosen bargaining 
representative (as contemplated by Labor Code, section 923, 
and related statutes) in the absence of "necessary adminis-
trative machinery and statutory guitles" (p. 473, ante) 
and that disputes with an employer who is not engaged in 
interstate commerce, or labor disputes which affect such 
commerce but as to which the National Labor Relations Board 
declines jurisdiction, ~ must be resolved by "the free [and 
destructive] interaction of economic forces" (p. 473, ante) 
such as those which have been at work in the subject dispute, 
without the aid of the judicial process. I cannot agree that 
the courts are so impotent or incompetent that they cannot 
or should not in a proper case give force to the statutorily 
declared public policy of this state in this important field. 
My views in this regard are stated in more detail infra, 
p. 492 et seq . 
It appears to me that nationally the trend of thinking 
is generally toward firmer enforcement and further develop-
ment of laws governing intra-labor group and labor-manage-
ment excesses rather than toward relaxation and back-pedal-
ling. In this regard I call attention to United Steelworkers 
v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 39 [80 S.Ct. 1, 4 L.Ed.2d 
violence in violation of a preliminary injunction, and personally paT-
ticipated in shadowing employes and customers of the picketed employer] ; 
Oil Workers Intl. Union v. Superior COllrt (1951), 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 
552 [18], 554-555, 565 [230 P.2d 71] [offieers of the loeal union did 
not inform picketing members, who threw stones and made threats, of 
the terms of a temporary restraining order which the officers felt was 
"just another move on the part of the Company to break the strike and 
weaken the morale of the members"; the president of the international, 
in a speech to the members, asked them not to encourage violence "just 
so long as your pieket lines remain inviolate "l. 
'We must reeognize that the area in which eonduet eonneeted with a 
labor dispute was formerly irremediable even though it was tortious 
under state law and an unfair labor practice under federal law (sec 
Chat'ez v. Sargent (1959), slipra, 52 Ca1.2d 162, 208-211) will proh-
ably be much reduced under the 1959 amendment of section 14 of the 
National Labor Relations Act to provide til at "(e) (1) The [National 
Labor Relations] Board, in its discretion, may ... decline to assert 
jurisdiction oyer any labor dispute ... where, in the opinion of the Board, 
the effect of such labor dispute on eommerce is not sufficiently substantial 
to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction ... (2) Nothing in this Act. 
shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State' 
... from Rssuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over 
which tlle Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, 
• to assert jurisdiction. " 
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12, 169], in which the United States Supreme Court, per 
curiam, upholds an injunction obtained by the United States 
Attorney General under section 208 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 as amended (29 U.S.C.A. § 178). 
That section provides that a district court, on petition of 
the Attorney General at the President's direction, has juris-
diction to enjoin a strike or lock-out "and to make such 
other orders as may be appropriate," if the court finds that 
such strike or lock-out affects an entire industry or a sub-
stantial part thereof engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce or production of goods for commerce and will, if 
permitted, imperil the national health and safety. 
In affirming the order of the court of appeals, which 
affirmed the district court's order against the contentions 
of the petitioner union, the supreme court says (p. 4 of 80 
S.Ct.): "The petitioner suggests that a selective reopening 
of some of the steel mills would suffice to fulfill specific de-
fense needs. . . . There is no room in the statute for this 
requirement which the petitioner seeks to impose upon the 
Government. . . • 
". . . Petitioner contends that the statute is constitution-
ally invalid because it does not set up any standard of 
lawful or unlawful conduct on the part of labor or manage-
ment. But the statute does recognize certain rights in tl1e 
public to have unimpeded for a time production in industries 
vital to the national health or safety. It makes the United 
States the guardian of these rights in litigation. [Citations.) 
The availability of relief, in the common judicial form of an 
injunction, depends on findings of fact, to be judicially 
made.'" 
The very fact of enactment by Congress and signing by 
the President of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 (1959 Pocket Part of (1956) 29 U.S.C.A.), 
providing a "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organiza-
"It is also to be noted that the vigorous language of Justiee Brandeis, 
dissenting in Duplex Printing PreB8 Co. v. Deering (1921),254 U.S. 443, 
488 r41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349, 16 A.L.R. 196]-deelaring that the 
Legislature, in eonnection with industrial disputes, "may substitute 
proeesses of justiee for the more primitive method of trial by eombat"-
now appears in the eoneurring opinion of Justiees Frankfurter and Harlan 
(p. 182 of 80 S.Ct.), and those eoneurring justiees pertinently add that 
seetions 206 through 209 of the Labor Management Relations Aet of 1947 
liS amended "were designed to provide maehinery for safeguarding th" 
eomprehensive interest of the eommunity, and to promote the national 
})oliey of eollective bargaining. They mUBt be cOfIBtruea to /live fun effect J 
to tAe protectioM 'Acy see} to aflord." (Italies added.) 
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tions," much like California's Bill of Rights for workmen 
as recognized in Ohavez v. Sargent (1959), supra, 52 Cal.2d 
162, 194 [27], is strong evidence that there is a rising need 
for government under law in labor disputes, rather than 
for abdication of the court (decreed by the majority today) 
in favor of "the free interaction of economic forces" (p.469, 
ante) such as those applied in this case-and on a larger scale 
in the recently abated and thereafter settled steel strike. 
Lest it be urged that the above related actions of Congress 
and the President in 1959 have no popular support beyond 
the halls of Congress and the White House, it seems proper 
to quote from an address by Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson to the 
Institute of Life Insurance in New York City on December 
8, 1959, as reported in the U. S. News & World Report (Dec. 
21, 1959; vol. XLVII, No. 25, p. 104): "The steel strike 
dramatizes the fact HIIl.t we are now at the end of an era. 
Everybody is agreed that this cannot happen again; that the 
public interest is the paramount interest, and that irrespon-
sible private power is an intolerable danger to our beleaguered 
society ...• 
"Where private groups-like big business or big labor-
are performing public functions, they must be held to pUblic 
responsibility. And one may forecast with some certainty 
that the Supreme Court will increasingly hold them to this 
responsibility .... 
"In September it proved necessary, for the first time in 
our history, for Government to establish controls over the 
internal affairs of the labor unions-their constitutions, their 
electic:ms, the administration of their offices-because of the 
irresponsibility of a comparatively few labor leaders. This 
was a failure, not just for the unions, but for democracy. 
The system is weaker today than it would have been if labor 
had done for itself what Government has now had to do 
for it." 
In the face of the facts recounted I deem it regrettable 
that California today steps backward. 
Turning to the narrower aspects of the subject case, it is 
my further opinion that the evidence does not, as a matter 
of law, establish employer interference with the employes' 
association within the meaning of section 1117 of the Labor 
Code. I recognize that, so far as the evidence now before us 
discloses, defendant union, through an organizer authorized 
to do so, between June 27 and August 6, 1957, without im-
) 
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proper pressure obtained tJle freely chosen written authoriza-
tion of nine of the ten drivers then employed by Petri that 
the union should represent them in collective bargaining.7 
During this period between June 27 and August 6, 1957, the 
employer threatened to discharge employes who chose to 
support the union; it did give notices of termination of 
employment to" A driver who stated that "he was probably 
going to have""to stay with the union" and a driver who 
"refused to tell him either way,"S and two other drivers 
signed letters prepared by the employer withdrawing their 
union authorization. Then the majority employes' freely 
chosen representatives visited the employer on August 7,1957, 
and sought to begin negotiation of a contract, and the em-
ployer announced its refusal "to negotiate with any union." 
(By this, the trier of fact could properly understand, the 
employer meant what was said: "any union"; that is, any 
union whether organizer-dominated or employe-controlled, 
and whether international, national or local and independ-
ent.) The employer then called a meeting of the drivers 
and reiterated its refusal "to recognize a union as a bar-
gaining agent." On the morning of August 8, 1957, eight 
of the drivers (including one who had signed a letter with-
YIn this regard the Dine drivers and defendant's organizer were exer-
cising the rights referred to as follows in the Chavez ease (pp. 203·204 
(39] of 52 CaUd): "Section 1119, fitting the jurisdictional strike leg· 
islation into the policy generally enunciated in section 923, cautions that 
'Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to interfere with collective 
bargaining 'l£bject to the prohibiti0n8 herein ,et forth, nor to prohibit 
any individual 1I0lu'IItarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor 
organization, or from personally requesting any other indiTidual to join 
a labor organization.' (Italics added.) Again, it must be noticed, the 
Legislature carefully preserves the basic elements of collective bargaining 
wldcll are declared in section 923 to be the policy of the state, including, 
of course, the specifically mentioned right of self·organization to that 
end, but makes it clcar that the exercise of the right to bargain collectively 
is 'subject to the prohibitions herein set forth' and that such limitations 
do not 'prohibit any individual 1I01untarily becoming or remaining a 
member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any other 
individual to join' (italics added) the organization, a right such as that 
which was upheld in In re Porterfield (1946), ••. 28 CaUd 91 [168 
P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675]." 
'This sort of coercion against the employes' selecting the union of 
their choice as bargaining representative was as contrary to the statutory 
policy of this state 8S was the converse sort of coercion condemned in 
Betail Clerks' U",ion v. Superior Oourt (1959), 81£pra, 52 Cal.2d 222, 
224, and Gannon v. San Diego Bldg. Trade, Coutt.cil (1958), 81£pra, 49 
Ca1.2d 595, 606·609, i.e., union coercion designed to force an employer to 
compel his employes to accept union representation which the employes 
have not freely chosen. 
) 
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drawing his authorization to the union) met in the union 
offices and unanimously voted to strike. The strike and picket-
ing then began. 
At this point my view of the evidence (which is that of 
the trial court) differs from that of the majority. Here it 
should also be mentioned that this case originated in a trial 
court; that such court did see and hear witnesses testify; 
and that from its vantage point it found facts which fully 
support its orders. It is the duty of a reviewing court to 
approach its task imbued with a willingness to respect and 
support the law; to indulge all presumptions in favor of 
the regularity of the proceedings below and to examine the 
evidence only to find if there be any which the trial court 
could weigh and find sufficient. c, The only conflict may be 
the opposing inferences deducible from uncontradicted pro-
bative facts." (Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1946), 
28 Ca1.2d357, 359 [3] [170 P.2d 465].) "In reviewing the 
evidence . • • all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the 
respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences in-
dulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elemen-
tary .•. principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked 
as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins 
and ends with a determination as to whether there is any 
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which 
will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two 
or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, 
the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deduc-
tions for those of the trial court." (Crawford v. Southern 
Pacific Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 183]; see 
also Powell v. Pacific Electri.c Ry. Co. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 40, 
41-42 [216 P.2d 448] ; Callahan v. G"ay (1955), 44 Cal.2d 
107, 111 [2, 3] [279 P.2d 963].) "The rule quoted is as 
applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when 
considering a jury's verdict." (Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 
Cal.2d 221,223 [2] [143 P.2d 689].) Furthermore, this court 
no longer ago than 1956, in Bailey v. County of Los Angeles, 
46 Ca1.2d 132, 137 [3, 4, 5] [293 P.2d 449], unanimously 
reiterated the holding of Murray v. Superior Court (1955), 
44 Ca1.2d 611, 619 [6, 7, 8] [284 P.2d 1], that" [3] 'An 
appellate court will not disturb the implied findings of fact 
made by a trial court in support of an order, any more than 
it will interfere with express findings upon which a final 
judgment is predicated. [4] When the evidence is conflict-
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ing, it will be presumed that the court found every fact 
necessary to support its order that the evidence would justify. 
[5] So far as it has passed on the weight of the evidence, its 
implied findings are conclusive. This rule is equally applicable 
whether the evidence is oral or documentary.' " 
In contrast, the majority today approach the issue of fact 
as follows: "If .the Association was 'interfered with, domi-
nated or controlled' by plaintiff, it is not a 'labor organiza-
tion' within the meaning of section 1117 aud there has been 
110 jurisdictional strike within the meaning of section 1118. 
The determination of this issue is crueial to defendant's ap-
peal from the order granting a preliminary injunction against 
defendant's strike. In deciding that issue we must first in-
terpret the terms 'interfered with, dominated or controlled' 
and then in the light of our interpretation determine whether 
plaintiff sustained its burden of proving that the Association 
is a labor organization." (P. 459 [3], ante.) 
If we approach consideration of the above related evidence 
with fair and open minds and obedient to the rules previously 
established by this court and quoted above, it at once ap-
pears that the above described .. coercion" of the employer 
designed to induce the drivers not to be represented by de-
fendant or any union, need not be understood as "interfer-
ence" with the subsequently organized Independent Associa-
tion of Petri Employees. There is no evidence that the 
employer entered into a compact with any "organizer" 
agreeing to require the employes to join the organizer's asso-
ciation or any other group or suffer dismissal from employ-
ment. There is no evidence whatsoever that anyone had 
spoken of a company or independent union before August 8, 
when the strike and picketing began. It was only after the 
strike was under way that Charles Bard (hired as a super-
visor on August 8) and Dan Burns (the one driver who had 
not authorized defendant union to represent him and who 
thereafter refused to join the Independent Association) spoke 
with representatives of the employer concerning the forma-
tion of an inside union. 
Roland Matthews, the Petri employe who organized the 
Independent Association, testified that three or four weeks 
after the strike began he became interested in forming such 
an association because he heard from a Bowen employe (see 
majority opinion, p. 463, footnote 4) that the formation of 
an independent association at that plant had resulted in the 
, 
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settlement of a labor dispute there; Matthews and other 
Petri employes felt that "the situation was a deadlock" and 
he wished "to get the plant settled down and get over the 
tension"; therefore, Matthews inquired of the employer's 
manager whether "Mr. Petri would go along with an inde-
pendent association or organi7.ation and negotiate a working 
agreement" and Petri st.ated that he would do so but "he 
[Petri] could have nothing to do with it, which I [Matthews] 
knew he couldn't." Thereafter Matthews took no further 
action concerning the formation of the Association until De-
cember, 1957. 
Although the evidence as to the genesis of the Association 
would support a finding that the employer" interfered" with 
it, in the sense of encouraging it, it does not appear to me 
that such a finding is as a matter of law compelled or that 
the contrary finding of the trial court is unsupported. The 
trial court could-and, if we follow the law we have often 
declared in other types of cases, we must presume did-
believe that the testimony of Bard and Matthews as to state-
ments of Petri and other representatives of management 
that they could have nothing to do with the formation of an 
independent organization indicated the intent of management 
not to interfere. It could and presumptively did believe that 
statements of representatives of management, made after the 
strike and picketing had begun, that Petri approved of and 
would recognize an inoependent organization were not made 
as encouraging ("interfering" with) its formation and did 
not have the effect of "dominating" or "controlling" the 
employes, but were made for the purpose of letting the 
employes know that despite Petri's long history of expressed 
antagonism toward unions-any unions and all unions-he 
was now coming to the point where he would not oppose 
the formation of an independent union or labor organization 
or insist that the employes who attempted to organize it 
must choose between employment with Petri and such or-
ganizational activity. The First Amendment protects the 
employer's right to noncoereive expression of its views on 
labor policies and problems. (NoHonol Labor Rc1ation.~ Boord 
v. Virginia Electric & PO'l'cr 00. (1941), 314 U.S. 469, 477 
[62 8.Ct. 344, 86 L.Ed. 348]; National Labor Relations 
Board v. Ford Motor Co. (1940, C.C.A. 6). 114 F.2d 905, 
913-9]5 [12-19], rert. den. 312 n.s. 689 [61 8.Ct. 621, 85 
ILEd. 1126].) 
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In December, 1957, Matthews began active organizational 
efforts. He again sought and received the assurance of Petri 
that there would be no discrimination against employes who 
participated in an "independent union." The only direct 
evidence that any representative of management gave 
Matthews any aid during his activities which led up to the 
organizational meeting of January 8, 1958, is the testimony 
of Bard, a supervisory employe, that at Matthews' request he 
recommended the names of two drivers who might assist in 
the formation of the Association. 
The testimony that on January 8 representatives of man-
agement "instructed the drivers ... that if the work was 
finished they could be in by 4 :00 that day" in order to 
attend the meeting- does not compel an inference of company 
domination. (See Ottli1i4ry Alliance etc. Union v. Beasley 
(1955), 135 Cal.App.2d 186, 193 [5] [286 P.2d 844].) The 
testimony that representatives of management walked about 
and watched the meeting place and "checked" a nearby pool 
hall "in case that there was any trouble, any violence," does 
not necessarily indicate the employer's improper support 
of the formation of the Association; it could also indicate 
that the employer did anticipate and wished to forestall 
possible "trouble" or "violence." That "trouble" or "vio-
lence" might come from defendants was not an unreasonable 
fear. 
The events after the organizational meeting of January 8 
do not compel inferences of management-inspired haste and 
lack of full and free participation by the employes in the 
obtaining of the recognition agreement of January 9 and 
the contract negotiated between the Association and the em-
ployer on January 16. There is evidence that employes were 
anxious to have the pickets removed from the plant. It is 
also significant that Meader, a perSOll experienced in labor 
organization problems and not connected with the employer,' 
was engaged by Matthews, consulted with him and other 
employes, and aided in the conduct of the organizational 
meeting. (See Voeltz v. Bakers etc. U11imt (1953), 40 Ca1.2d 
382, 386 [2] [254 P.2d 553].) It is to be observed also that 
the Voeltz case upheld a preliminary injunction under the 
Jurisdictional Strike Law in a situation similar to the present 
-Meader bad previously done some investigath'e and pbotostatic work 
for plaintiff's attorney in respects not conneeted with this matter, but 
they had no contact in connection with the formation of the Association. 
) 
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one in that the contest for jurisdiction was between an in-
ternational union, together with its local affiliates, and an 
independent employes; association which had been formed 
behind picket lines after tbe affiliates of the international 
union had picketed for 11 months in an attempt to enforce 
their demand for acceptance byplaintiti employer and a 
commitment by him to compel his employes to join and pay 
dues to the demanding union. 
It thus appears to me that, viewed by rules which are 
presumed to govern reviewing courts (and which were re-
spected by the District Court of Appeal in its unanimous 
decision, reported (1959, Cal.App.) 340 P.2d 731, 735-738), 
the evidence fully supports the trial court's :finding that in 
January, 1958, the drivers then employed by Petri formed 
a labor organization which was not "financed in whole or 
in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the em-
ployer" within the meaning of section 1117 of the Labor 
Code. Such a determination, upon a preliminary injunction, 
is of course not a determination of the merits of the con-
troversy. (People v. Black's Food Store (1940), 16 Ca1.2d 
59,62 [105 P.2d 361].) Nor is the trial court's denial of the 
temporary injunction sought by the union a :final determina-
tion of that aspect of the controversy. 
The union's contention that upon the assertedly undisputed 
facts the trial court should presently grant it affirmative re-
lief by preliminary injunction requiring the employer to 
recognize and bargain with the union and disestablish the 
Association is not wen taken. The facts of the controversy 
have not been fully explored. "The granting of a mandatory 
injunction pending the trial, and before the rights of the 
parties in the subject matter ,vhicb the injunction is de-
signed to affect have been definitively ascertained by the 
chancellor, is not permitted except in extreme cases where 
the right thereto is clcarly established and it appears that 
irreparable injury will flow from its refusal." (Hagen v. 
Beth (1897),118 Cal. 330, 331 [50 P. 425].) 
Upon the evidence before it, the trial court's denial of 
the preliminary injunction sougllt b)r the demanding union 
may well have been based upon a proper determination 
that there was no showing that irreparable injury would 
result from denial of such pendente lite relief. Indee(l, a 
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at this stage of the proceedings. (Santa Cruz F. B. Assn. 
v. Grant (1894), 104 Cal. 306, 308 [37 P. 1034] ; Lagunitas 
W. Co. v. Marin Oounty W. 00. (1912), 163 Cal. 332, 336 
[125 P. 351].) 
This matter should be fully tried upon the merits so that 
it can be finally determined whether the group of driver 
employes who formed the Association in January, 1958, did 
so free of employer interference; whether the group of driver 
employes whose majority signed union authorizations in the 
summer of 1957 did so voluntarily; and whether the em-
ployer in violation of sections 921 through 923 of the Labor 
Code discharged union men and refused to continue the 
employment of drivers who joined the union, or whether the 
employer's refusal to recognize the union in August, 1957, 
was permissible refusal to submit to demands which were 
unlawful under Garmon (1958), Sllpm, 49 Ca1.2d 595, Chavez 
(1959), supra, 52 Cal.2d 162, and Retail Clerks' Union 
(1959), supra, 52 Ca1.2d 222. Until such facts are ascer-
tained I am not prepared to say what right, if any, of the 
union t{) affirmative relief may be developed. 
However, it is my opinion, speaking generally, that Rince 
section 923 of the Labor Code commits the state to a public 
policy of "protecting collective bargaining" (Chavez v. Sar-
gent (1959), supra, 52 Cal.2d 162, 179 [9], 186 [13]; In 
re Porterfield (1946), supra, 28 Ca1.2d 91, 119 [29]; Shafer 
v. Registered Pharnwcists Union (1940), 16 Cal.2d 379, 385 
[3] [106 P.2d 403]), workmen who have freely designated 
a bargaining representative by voluntary majority selection 
have legal "rights of collective bargaining" which can hp. 
protected and enforced by appropriate equitable decree at 
the suit of such representative (Ohavez v. Sargent, supra, 
pp. 193, 205-206 [46,47]; Silva v. Jfercier (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 
704,706 [1], 707 [2] [204 P.2d 609] ; Elsi.s v. Evans (1958), 
157 Cal.App.2d 399, 409-410 [2, 1b] [321 P.2d 514]; see 
Wnliams v. International etc. of Boilermakers (1946), 27 
Ca1.2d 586, 590 [2] [165 P.2d 903]). 
The majority say that recognition and enforcement of such 
right would improperly require the trial court •• to sit as a 
labor board and thus determine the appropriateness of bar-
gaining units, conduct elections, certify the majority repre-
sentative, and direct collective bargaining," all without spe-
cific statutory guidance. But courts are required daily to 
decide questions in complicated fields in which the particular 
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judge may not have the particular expertise,lO and in which 
the particular rules may not have been developed, which 
are to be expected, for example, in the case of an administra-
tive board or of a judge who sits for a substantial period 
of time in a specialized department. Such difficulties (or 
the difficulties that may result because different trial judges 
of the same court may have sharply differing views of the 
law which is applicable to the field; see Horwin, The Labor 
Re"latwns Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court 
(1942), 31 Cal.L.Rev. 16) are not reason for announcing as 
a principle of law that rights inevitably flowing from a 
legislative declaration of policy and general rules cannot be 
enforced. 
Nor does it appear that the lack of definition or explana-
tion by the California Legislature of such matters as what 
constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit,11 or who are 
1·The following eases are mentioned merely by way of example: Manda-
tory injunctions requiring exceedingly complicated acts directed in com· 
paratively simple terms have been affirmed and contempt decrees for thcir 
violation upheld. (E.g., People v. City of Lo8 .&ngele8 (1948), 83 Cal. 
App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]; City of Vernon v. Superior Coon (1952), 
38 Ca1.2d 509 [241 P.2d 243]; and City of Cul1!er City v. Superior Court 
(1952), 38 Ca1.2d 535 [241 P.2d 258] [the Hyperion sewage plant 
cases].) In water rights cases this court has urged the trial courts to 
devise injunctive physical solutions of complex problems, and has pointed 
out that a court of equity is not limited by the suggestions of the parties 
and has broad powers to work out a just solution of the case. (Tulare 
Irr. Dist. v. Lind8ay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 489, 574 
L54] [45 P.2d 972]; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail (1938),11 Cal.2d 
501,560 [25] [81 P.2d 533].) 
In Oklahoma v. Texas (1920), 252 U.S. 372 [40 S.Ct. 353, 64 L.E(I. 
619]; id. (1921),256 U.S. 607 [41 S.Ct. 540,65 L.Ed. 1116]; id. (1923), 
261 U.S. 340 [43 S.Ct. 379, 67 L.Ed. 687]; id. (1923), 262 U.S. 50;; 
[43 s.m. 701, 67 L.Ed. 1094]; id. (1924), 264 U.S. 565 [44 S.Ct. 455, 
68 L.Ed. 852]; id. (1924), 265 U.S. 76, 490, 493, 500, 505, 513 [44 S.Ct. 
457, 68 L.Ed. 908], the United States Supreme Court, through a re-
ceiver and commissioners, not only surveyed lands and established bound-
ary Jines, but also drilled oil wells (including some dry holes) and pro-
duced oil and gas. 
In situations luch as the foregoing, the courts went about their business 
of attempting to lolve problems by application of the judicial process 
despite the fact that (it may be assumed) they were without particular 
expert knowledge in the fields of sewage disposal, protection of water 
resources, or oil and gas production. 
"It may be mentioned that Congress did not tell the National Labor 
Relations Board what constituted an appropriate bargaining unit. Rather, 
it. told the board to decide "whether, in order to insure to employees the 
fullest freedom in exercising rights guaranteed by this [National Labor 
Relations Act, as amended] ... , the unit appropriate for the purpose of 
collective bargailli:ng shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, 
or subdivision thereof," and made only three specific provisions in this 
) 
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employes eligible to vote in an election to select a bargaining 
representative12 (see quotation from majority opinion as to 
this "host of problems," ante, pp. 478-479), present insoluble 
difficulties. In this connection it may be mentioned that the 
eourts of this state dealt for many years with questions of 
labor relations without statutory guidance as to what con-
stituted a "labor organization" or "union," bona fide or 
otherwise; they have never had any statutory guidance as to 
who is a "union organizer," authorized or unauthorized; 
in the 1930's the term "collective bargaining" appeared in 
a number of statutes (e.g., in addition to Lab. Code, § 923, 
in Lab. Code, §§ 222, 224, 554) without any statutory infor-
mation as to the nature of the process or what constitutes 8 
valid collective bargaining agreement. 
Concerning the problem of conducting a representation 
election, it may be said that where the question of employe 
representation for collective bargaining purposes is raised 
in an action by an employer or union (or, as in this case, 
by cross-actions of both), a California court probably cannot, 
without some cooperation of at least one of the parties, di-
rectly compel them to resort to t.he auspices of an adminis-
trative body constituted for the purpose of conducting or 
supervising representation elections, for there is in California 
no such administrative body specifically required to furnish 
regard; i.e., that the board shall not (1) include professional employes 
in a unit with nonprofessionals unless a majority of the professionals vote 
for inclusion; (2) decide that a craft unit is inappropriate on the ground 
that a different unit has been previously established unless a majority of 
the employes in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representa· 
tion; (8) include company guards in a unit which includes other employes. 
(National Labor Relations Act, ~ 9(b); 29 U.S.C.A. (1956), ~ 159(b).) 
Naturally, the board has developed expertise as to what bargaining 
units work most effectively in various situations, but the federal courts, 
without such expertise, are able to pass upon the correctness of its deter· 
minations in this regard. (E.g., National Labor Relations Board v. 
Hearst Publications (1944), 822 U.S. 111, 182 [64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 
1170]; Pittsburgh Glass 00. v. National Lobor Relations Board (1941). 
318 U.S. 146, 156 [61 S.Ct. !l08, 85 L.Ed.1251).) 
"Congress by its 1959 amendment of section 9(c)(8) of the National 
Labor Relations Act did not give the board particular statutory guidance 
in this regard, but merely a wider ambit for determination, by changing 
the rule that •• Employees on strike who aro not entitled to reinstatement 
shall not be eligible to vote," to provide that •• Employees engaged in 
an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible 
to vote under such regulations as the [National Labor Relations] Board 
shall find are consistent with the purposp-s and provisions of this Act in 
any election eonducted within twelve months after the commencement of 
the strike." (29 U.B.C.A. (1956, and 1959 Pocket Part), ~ 159(e) (8).) 
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such services at the direction of a court. (See Chavez v. 
8argent (1959), supra, 52 Ca1.2d 162, 215 [56].) But the 
court can enjoin picketing by a union where it determines 
that the object of such picketing is to force the employer 
to recognize the union although such union does not repre-
sent a majority of the affected employes (and, if the question 
arises, that the disaffection of the subject employes for the 
picketing union is not the result of their participation in a 
company-dominated union). (Lab. Code, §§ 923, 1116-1118.) 
Or the court can enjoin the employer from recognizing and 
maintaining a company union if it determines that a majority 
of his employes would prefer representation by the picketing 
union but adhere to the company union for fear of reprisal. 
(Lab. Code, §§ 1116, 1117, 1122.) Parties to a labor dispute 
faced with recognition of these injunctive powers of the 
court would undoubtedly be more willing to cooperate in 
working out or accepting a plan for a fair election (see 
Chavez v. 8argent, sup"a, pp. 215-216 of 52 Cal.2d, footnote 
16), by reference if necessary, or to accept the services of 
the State Conciliation Service, a state agency which itself 
has no enforcement powers and no specifically enjoined duty 
to conduct representation elections (except in limited situa-
tions not at this time applicable to private employers), but 
which has facilities for and expertise in conducting repre-
sentation elections where the parties agree thereto and the 
number of affected employes is not too great.11 
"The State Conciliation Service was created by the director of the 
Department of Industrial Relations under section 65 of tbe Labor Code. 
That section now provides (Stats. 1949, eb. 568, p. 1058) that the de· 
partment "may investigate and mediate labor disputes providing any 
bona fide party to such dispute requests intervention by the department 
and the department may proft"er its sen-ices to both parties when work 
stoppage is threatened and neither party requests intervention. In the 
interest of preventing labor disputes the department shall endeavor to 
promote sound union-employer relationships. The department may arbi· 
trate or arrange for the selection of boards of arbitration on sucb terms 
as all of the bona fide parties to such dispute may agree upon .•.. " 
As originally enacted (Stats. 1939, ch. 810, p. 2368) section 65 pro· 
vided for department intervention only wben "all bona fide parties to 
such dispute join in a request for intervention." Concerning such vol· 
untary mediation tribunals it was said by Messrs. Matbew 0_ Tobriner 
(now Associate Justice of tbe District Court of Appeal, First District, 
Division One) and Ricbard S. Goldsmith (then both of the San Francisco 
Bar) in "Cooling-Off" and Mediation Stat'utes in tIle States (1947), 
20 So.Cal.L.Rev. 264, 272·273, "Tbese tribunals are the Bole agencies 
for maintaining industrial peace and safeguarding the rights of labor, 
and are not complemented by labor relations acts which are articulated 
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In the present case it seems to me, without suggesting 
what the trier of fact should find upon the evidence which 
may develop, that it might find that the driver employes, 
whether or not they constitute the sole possible appropriate 
bargaining unit, do constitute an appropriate bargaining 
by enforcement agencies. To this extent they are seriously handicapped, 
regardless of their formal structure or their prescribed procedure." 
In its present form section 65 can be given more comprehensive appli· 
cation than in its original form; in 1951 (18 Ops. Ca1.Atty.Gen. 216, 218) 
Hie attorney general expressed the view that the conciliation service must 
investigate and mediate labor disputes when a bona fide party requests 
intervention, and has discretion to offer its services when no party reo 
quests intervention. Thc conciliation seryice itself is of the view that 
"Collective bargainiDg has prospered in California under this principle 
[of "voluntarism" adopted in section 65]" (1958 Annual Report of 
State Conciliation Serviee, p. 7); however, the conciliation service has 
also referred to developments of "compulsion and the exercise of au· 
thority through government" in the labor laws of other states and ill 
federal legislation, and predicts that "changes ahead may further 
shrink the area of voluntarism aud self·government" (id., p. 13). 
An example of such" compulsion" is the legislatiVe invocation of tho 
conciliation service by the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Act (Stats. 1957, ch. 547, amended Stats. 1959, eh. 519). (See (1958) 32 
0p8. Cal.Atty.Gen. 25; 1958 Annual Report of State Conciliation Service, 
pp. 7,16-17.) The act (§ 3.6(c» (in aecord with the policy declared in 
Lab. Code, § 923, and related sections, as construed and upheld in Chavez 
v. Sargent) recognizes that "Employees [of the transit authority] shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi· 
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." It requires 
lubmission to the conciliation service of any "question whether a labor 
organization represents a majority of employees or whether the proposed 
unit is or is not appropriate" (§ 3.6(d». Under this legislation the 
conciliation service has authoritatively conducted elections and certified 
bargaining representatives for the transit authority employes. 
Also compulsory collective bargaining, and authoritative designation 
of bargaining units, conduct of representation elections, and certification 
by the conciliation service for transit district employes are provided for 
by the Public Utilities Code (§§ 25051,25052, Stats. 1955, ch. 1036). 
Although the conduct of representation elections is not mentioned in 
section 65 of the Labor Code, this "common procedure in collective bar-
gaining ..• is applied by the Conciliation Ser ... ice" to solve representa' 
tion questions in pri ... ate industry. (1951 Annual Report of State Con-
ciliation Service, p. 9.) "The supervision of employee elections by the 
State Conciliation Service is by voluntary agreement of all parties in 
collective bargaining relationships, actual or potential .... The parties 
must agree in advance that they will accept and will abide by the results 
of the election." (1958 id., p. 14; 1957 id., p. 11.) The use of the offices 
of the conciliation service to conduct elections in representation disputes 
"implements the policy which is written into the State Labor Code 
[§ 923], namely' ..• that the individual workman [shall] have full 
freedom of association, self·organization, and designation of repre-
sentath'es of his own choosing ... '" (1956 id., p. 20.) Tllerefore, 
judicial enforcement of an agreement between an employer and a union 
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unit, and that it could determine (by reference, if necessary) 
wh('ther the union, the Association, or neither is the bar-
gaining representative of a majority of that group as to the 
time of the institution of this litigation. 
This dissent, of course, is not intended to constitute a 
criticism of my brothers who comprise today's majority; I 
respect them highly. It is, however, an effort to show that 
their views on the subject issues are unjustified by law and 
undesirable in philosophy, and possibly to assist some future 
differently constituted majority, or the Legislature, or the 
people by initiative, to take steps that will lead us perma-
nently away from the ungoverned procedures, the uncivilized 
actions, all too often including brutal assaults, and the in-
evitably wasteful results which are inherent in the" free inter-
action of economic forces" espoused by today's majority. 
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the order grant-
ing plaintiff a temporary injunction and denying defendant's 
application for a temporary injunction. 
Spence, J., and McComb, J., coneurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
24, 1960. Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
for a representation election under the auspices of the conciliation service, 
was decreed in California Hotel v. Culinary Workers, San Bernardino 
County Superior Court No. 87141 (1956 ia., pp. 37·38). (In Griffin v. 
Lima (1954),124 Cal.App.2d 697, 698, 701 [269 P.2d 191], the complaint 
of the union alleged tbat sueh an election was held under an agreement 
by wbich defendant employers undertook to recognize and bargain with 
the union if a majority of the employes designated it as their bargaining 
representative, but after a majority of the employes voted to be repre· 
sented by the union the employers refused to bargain. The trial eourt 
made its minute order providing that" IT]be Union having admittedly 
won the election, the defendant.s should now be required to negotiate. 
A temjlorary injunction will therefore issue as prayed for in the eom· 
plaint." Defenuants' appeal from this minute order was dismissed 
berause it was not a final appealable order. The question whether the 
agreement could be specifically enforced (e.g., by mandatory injunction 
requiring defendants to bargain) was left open.) 
It may be mentioned also that, although supervision of a representation 
, election by the conciliation service "is not a substitute for any legal 
obligation which may adhere to any party through State or Federal law," 
the N.L.R.B. recognizes the accuracy of the results of such elections and 
:lCeords thcm the same status as elections conducted by the federal board. 
(1958 Annual Report of State Conciliation Service, p. 14.) 
